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ABSTRACT 
Searching for a job takes time. Employers also need time to fill a vacancy. 
Therefore, at any time we will find that employers and workers are searching 
for each other. We analyze the matching process for employers and workers 
who use personnel advertisement as a search channel. The matching model is 
estimated using micro economie data from an employers survey and a workers 
survey. We find that there are differences in matching probabilities for 
workers distinguished by job type, labour market status and gender. An 
additional analysis in which we use information on workers (reservation) 
wages indicates that, conditional on the observed job characteristics, 
employers prefer employed workers over unemployed workers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Workers find a (new) job and employers find a new employee as a result of 
a process in which both sides of the labour market interact. Workers at the 
supply side of the labour market are confronted with employers from the 
demand side of the labour market. The number of matches is determined by 
the total number of job seekers and vacancies operating through that market 
and the probability that a potential contact is actually translated into a match. 
Consistent with this notion we start our analysis with matching functions 
defmed for specific labour markets, distinguished by education, occupation, 
region and search channel use. We estimate the parameters of the matching 
function for workers and employers who use personnel advertisement as a 
search channel. 
The parameters of a matching function are the matching probability and 
scale parameters (geometrie weights) indicating the relative importance of 
supply and demand. The matching probability can be written as a contact 
probability and the probability that, conditional on a contact, worker and 
employer agree on the terms of the contract. The contact probability reflects 
the effectiveness of the labour market in generating contacts. The conditional 
match probability, depending on a job offer and a job acceptance probability, 
reflects the characteristics of the wage formation. 
As a first step we estimate the model using 'macro' data on the total 
numbers of job seekers and vacancies combined with micro data on the 
duration of job search and the vacancy duration. Extra information on the 
number of contacts between employers and workers enables us to identify the 
contact probability from the conditional match probability. Additionally, we 
try to disentangle job offer probabilities from job acceptance probabilities. We 
find that job characteristics, employment status and gender are important 
characteristics of the matching process. We also find that, conditional on the 
observed job characteristics, employers prefer employed workers over 
unemployed workers. We find no differences in employers' preferences with 
respect to gender. 
This paper has two distinguishing characteristics. First, search information 
from both sides of the labour market are combined into an integrated analysis. 
Secondly, the probability of finding a job and/or filling a job vacancy are 
decomposed into a contact probability, a job offer probability and a job 
acceptance probability. The plan of the paper is as follows. The theoretical 
model is presented in section 2. Section 3 gives the empirical implementation. 
Section 4 describes the data and presents the likelihood. Section 5 contains the 
estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. THE MODEL 
In the labour market the pool of employers searching for a new employee 
and the number of workers searching for a (new) job is generated by the 
search process at the individual level. The number of matches depends on the 
relative number of workers and employers searching in the market as well as 
on the speed at which a potential contact between job seeker and employer is 
translated into a match. In the literature the speed is seen as a measure of the 
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efficiency of the labour market. 
Workers and employers may meet if they operate on the same market, i.e. 
they have to match on job type and search channel use. Therefore, the total 
labour market is divided into different submarkets, each distinguished 
according to job type and search channel use. An employer searching for an 
academie worker may prefer to use advertisements over, for example, the 
employment office. Furthermore different type of job seekers may also prefer 
to use different search channels. In our model, job type is characterised by 
education, occupation and region. In a previous analysis on the effectiveness 
of different search methods we consider informal search channels, the 
employment office and advertisements. For reasons of simplicity and 
homogeneity of the considered sample, in this paper we restrict ourselves to 
advertisements. 
In each submarket (indexed by i) the number of contacts (C) between job 
seekers and vacancies in a period of time [t,t+dt> depends on the number of 
job seekers (N) and the number of vacancies (V) at time t, and the contact 
probability. The contact probability (X,) reflects the intensity of search, and 
differs for each type of job. More formally, we specify, for each job type the 
familiar Cobb-Douglas specification: 
C, = XH-^-V.' (1) 
The parameters a and B reflect the weights assigned to the number of 
jobseekers and the number of vacancies, indicating the relative importance of 
supply and demand. Relatively small values of a are associated with a labour 
market in which the number of job seekers hardly play a role in the matching 
process. We assume a and ü to be the same for all type of jobs. 
Conditional on the number of contacts between job seekers and employers 
(vacancies) , the flow of filled vacancies (F), or equivalently the flow of job 
seekers finding a (new) job, is determined by the conditional probability that a 
contact results in a match (X )^. This 'conditional match probability' depends 
on the job offer and job acceptance probability, both reflecting the 
characteristics of wage formation. 
Fs = X2i.q = X2.Xli.Ni"ViB (2) 
The efficiency parameter of the market (X) is defined as the product of the 
contact probability and the probability that, conditional on a contact, a contact 
results in a match (X = X,.X;;). This parameter may also be interpreted as the 
efficiency parameter indicating the speed at which, conditional on the number 
of job seekers and the number of vacancies, potential contacts result in a 
match. 
Examples of previous empirical studies using aggregate time series to 
estimate matching functions are Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Jackman, 
Layard and pissarides (1989) and Van Ours (1991). This paper differs 
markedly from the previous contributions. As in Lindeboom, van Ours and 
Renes (1991) the model is estimated on two micro economie datasets. 
Furthermore, we put special effort in identifying the contact probability (X,) 
from the conditional match probability (Xo). Finally, using a very rough 
procedure, we will disentangle the conditional match probability into a job 
offer probability component and a job acceptance component. We will be 
more precise about this in the next section, where we discuss the empirical 
implementation of the model. 
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3. EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
To estimate the matching function as specified in (2), for each submarket 
we need data on the flow of matches, the number of job seekers and the 
number of vacancies. In general information on F, N and V stratified to the 
use of advertisement and job type are not available. We will follow the same 
approach as in Lindeboom, van Ours and Renes (1991). The matching 
function (2) will be reformulated, and micro data on vacancy and search 
durations combined with aggregate data on the total number of job seekers and 
vacancies will be used to estimate the model. Below we briefly sketch this 
procedure. 
Data on the number of vacancies per job type (V;,) are available in The 
Netherlands. To construct the data on N, we use the following approach. 
There are data available on the number of unemployed job seekers categorized 
by job type. We also have data on the total number of employed workers per 
job type. To determine what fraction from the employed workers is looking 
for a job, we use micro data on the search behaviour of employed individuals. 
From this micro data we estimate the probability that someone working in job 
type i will be searching for a new job. Combining this probability with the 
total number of employed workers per job type gives us the total number of 
employed job seekers. Note that we implicitly assume that workers are looking 
for a job of the same type. 
Given the stratified data on the number of jobseekers and vacancies per job 
type (Vj* and N^), we have to determine which fraction is assigned to the use 
of advertisements. For that purpose we define q as the probability that for a 
randomly selected vacancy, of job type i, advertisements are used as a 
search/recruitment method. Using this probability in combination with V* we 
obtain the number of vacancies of job type i and advertisement use as: 
Vi=qi.Vi*. Analogously, with p- defïned as the probability that a randomly 
selected worker of type i uses advertisements, we obtain N^p^N,*. 
Furthermore, data on the flow of matches (F;) are not available in the 
Netherlands. However, from the pool of vacancies (V;) at time t, the flow of 
filled vacancies in a small interval dt can be obtained using the instantaneous 
rate of leaving this pool (the hazard rate). Hence we may write the hazard rate 
for vacancy durations, 6V-, as a simple ratio of F; to V;. Analogously, the 
hazard rate for the search duration, (f-, follows from the ratio of F; to Nj. So 
we have 
Ö > Fi/Vi (3a) 
08;= F M (3b) 
And using equations (2), (3a) and (3b) we may rewrite equation (2) as: 
6V.= XH.X2,Ni ' (4a) 
0> \yiX,NrlWf (4b) 
So, the matching function may be rewritten in terms of hazard rates of 
workers and vacancies, with Xi;, X,-„ a and £ as parameters of interest. To 
estimate this micro model we need data from a worker's survey and/or an 
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employer's survey combined with data on N; and V-,. The model will be 
estimated in (roughly) two steps. First from micro data on the use of 
search/recruitment methods we estimate the probabilities p; and ^ using simple 
probit analyses1. In combination with data on the number of vacancies and job 
seekers per job type we obtain N: and V;. In the second stage, using data on 
search and vacancy durations we can estimate the parameters a, B and X 
(=Xli.Xa). 
Sofar we have been unclear about the parameterisation X, and X^  and 
without additional information, these two parameters can not be identified. 
Furthermore it would be very interesting to see if, given the identification of 
\ and X2, \ could be disentangled into a job offer component, reflecting the 
employers hiring decision, and a job acceptance decision, reflecting the 
workers acceptance decision. Below we will discuss these issues. 
Parameterisation of X, and X, 
In the empirical implementation of the model the crucial components of the 
efficiency parameter X (Xn and X^ ) are specified as a function of the 
characteristics of a job X. The vector X contains education occupation, work 
experience and region. For both parameters we assume the logit specification. 
X, = exp(X'7l)/(l+exp(X'7l) (5) 
X, = exp(X'72)/(l+exp(X'72) (6) 
Clearly there may also be differences in contact rates and conditional matching 
probabilities for different subgroups on the labour market. Search behaviour, 
generating the contact probability may differ, for example, for employed male 
workers and unemployed female workers. And conditional on a contact 
employers may for example prefer employed male workers over unemployed 
female workers. Although, employers are legally not permitted to use 
employment status or gender as selection criteria, differences in conditional 
match probabilities may be observed. From the employer's point of view (the 
demand side) matching can be seen as a competing risk problem in which 
failure (termination of the vacancy duration) may be caused by either of the 
four sub groups: employed males, employed females, unemployed males and 
unemployed females. From the supply side of the market the different 
subgroups are in competition for the same type of job. We therefore specify 
different matching functions for unemployed male workers (urn), unemployed 
female workers (uf), employed male workers (em) and employed female 
workers (ef). For employed male workers we write: 
Fm=X1em.X2em.NaV^.(Nt7N) (7a) 
1
 For this part we rely on Lindeboom, van Ours and Renes (1991) where 
we are more precise about this part of the analysis. 
6 
And analogously for the other subgroups we write: 
Frf=X1ef.Vf.NaV.(Ne7N) (7b) 
Fum=X1um.X2um.Na V^ISP/N) (7c) 
Fuf=X1uf.\2uf-NaVg.(Nuf/N) (7d) 
For each subgroup (em, ef, urn, uf), the corresponding hazards can be defmed 
as the ratio of F/V for vacancies and Fk/Nk for workers, ke{em,ef,um,uf}. 
The matching functions, and hence the different hazards, are allowed to differ 
in \ and X2. In the specification of these parameters we only allow for a 
constant shift (this corresponds with the incorporation of a dummy). 
Identification of \ and X,, and disentangling X2 
To identify \ from \ we need additional information on the number of 
contacts between workers and employers. Our data sets have such information. 
We assume that the number of contacts has a Poisson distribution with a 
contact rate pi. For a vacancies we define the contact rate (per week) ^ as the 
ratio of the number of applicants to V; (^=C/W). Analogously we define 
the contact rate for a worker as ^ as the ratio of the number of applications 
to N; (fi'=C-JK). Of course, since the contact rate is a function of X1( separate 
dummies for each of the subgroups are incorporated. 
Note that contact probability \ tells us something about the search 
behaviour of employers and workers of each specific job type, independent 
from the relative number of jobseekers and workers that operate on the 
market. The conditional match X2 tells us something about the employer's 
hiring decision, and the worker's job acceptance decision. In search theoretic 
models that do not allow for variable search intensity, the joboffer arrival rate 
reflects both elements of \ and X;,. In such a model small values of the offer 
arrival rate may be due to employers and workers decision. The job offer 
component in the conditional matching probability purely reflects the 
employers hiring decision. 
Identification of the offer and the acceptance components may be quite 
cumbersome. Accepted wages, reservation wages from workers and (probably) 
reservation productivities from employers are required. Then the structure of 
the matching process in terms of reservation productivities, reservation wages 
and wages, as the outcome of the bargaining process, should be explicitly 
modelled. Of course also simplifying restrictions could be imposed to ease 
estimation. However, although we have reservation wages for employed and 
unemployed workers, we lack information of wages for the vacancy data, and 
we never observe the reservation productivities. For that reason we employ a 
very pragmatic method. On the workers sample we estimate simple, ad hoc 
reduced form wage equations and reservation wage equations. From these 
estimation results for each type of worker (or for an average worker) workers 
acceptance probabilities are calculated. Imposing a sequential structure, these 
calculated probabilities are confronted with the estimated conditional match 
probability Xj to obtain the employer's job offer component as a simple ratio 
Pr(job offer) = X2 / Pr (accept a job j job offer) (8) 
7 
4. DATA AND LIKELIHOOD 
4.1 Data 
The vacancy data we use in our analysis are from a Dutch vacancy survey2. 
The data were collected by the Organization for Labour Market Research 
(OSA). This survey was held in two steps. In the first step firms that had 
vacancies provided information on these vacancies. From this first step, 
conducted in November-January 1986-1987, we know for example the incom-
plete duration of the vacancy and the number of applicants that had arrived up 
to the moment of the survey. In the second step, conducted approximately 
four months after the first interview, information was collected on for example 
the date at which vacancies were filled (if they were filled) and the 
characteristics of the employee who was hired. The dataset contains no 
information on wage offers or accepted wages. Different search channels are 
used to find new employees. In this study we only consider the effectiveness 
of the advertisements as a search channel. From a previous analysis 
(Lindeboom, Van Ours and Renes (1991)) we know that informal search 
channels and the public employment office are more effective for unemployed 
workers. To get a homogenous set of vacancies we analyze a subsample of 
970 vacancies for which advertisements were used as a search channel. 
The data on employed and unemployed job seekers are from 2 waves of the 
OSA labour force panel. This panel consists of about 2000 households, the 
first survey was held in April 1985. Subsequent waves where held in 
September 1986 and September 1988. To analyze search behaviour of 
unemployed and employed workers we use the 1986 survey, containing 
information on 4115 respondents. After discarding observations for which 
essential variables are missing the sample contained 2442 employed and 212 
unemployed workers3. In the analysis we only use those jobseekers who used 
advertisements as a search channel. We have 187 employed job seekers and 
105 unemployed job seekers. In this survey information on reservation wages 
of job seekers and actual wages of workers is available. 
Table 1 gives information on the data we used in the analysis. The table 
shows the use and the effectiveness of personnel advertisements for both job 
seekers and employers. 
Table 1 Use and effectiveness of personnel advertisements: sample information 
Total Found Found Total 
by ads otherwise found" 
(%) (%) (%) 
Vacancies 970 42 24 66 
Employed job seekers 187 20 24 44 
Unemployed job seekers 105 6 24 30 
a)
 The percentages are calculated using a period of 4 months for vacancies and 
2 years for workers. 
2
 For an extended description of this survey we refer to Van Ours (1989) 
and Van Ours and Ridder (1992). 
3
 A person was considered to be unemployed if he or she was not working 
and actively seeking for a job, irrespective of the registration at the public 
employment office. 
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Table 1 shows that of the 970 vacancies for which personnel advertisements 
were used 42% was filled by advertisements and 24% by the use of another 
search channel. In total 34% of the vacancies was left un filled in the course of 
4 months. For employed job seekers the average effectiveness of adverti-
sements is much higher than for unemployed job seekers: 20% of the 
employed workers has found a new job by using advertisement, while for 
unemployed workers this is only 6%. Other search channels are on average 
equally efficiënt for employed and unemployed workers. 
Table 2 also shows that advertisements are on average more effective as a 
recruitment channel for employed workers, and more effective for female than 
for male workers. In our analysis we will study to what extent these 
differences in effectiveness are actually due to employment status and gender 
and to what extent these differences are due to for example skill differences 
between employed, unemployed, male and female workers. 
Table 2 Effectiveness of advertisements bv emplovment status and aender 
Searchers finding Vacancies filled 
a job by ads (%) by ads (%) 
Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed 
Male 20 2 42 31 
Female 22 10 52 45 
4.2 Likelihood 
From the matching function (2) we derived a micro model in which the 
hazard rates for workers and vacancies of a specific job type i are a function 
of \ , N; and V;. To identify X[ from X2 we combine data on job search and 
vacancy durations with information on the number of contacts between 
employers and workers. 
Denote T as a random variable associated with a job search duration, 0" is 
the corresponding hazard. Analogously S, with hazard rate 6" is defined as a 
random variable associated with employers search (vacancy) duration. Sirice 
we sample from the stock of employers and job search durations, we must 
base our likelihood on the distribution of the relevant variables in the stock. 
Let Ti and S, denote the elapsed job search and vacancy duration at the date 
of selection. Similarly, let T2 and S2 denote the (residual) search durations 
beyond the date of selection. We assume a constant inflow rate and absence of 
duration dependence in the hazards. As a consequence elapsed and residual 
durations are independently and identically exponential distributed (Ridder 
(1984)). 
Information on the number of contacts is obtained conditional on elapsed 
search duration. Hence it seems natural to write the joint probability for the 
event C=x, S,=s,, S,=s2 as Pr(C=c|S1=s1,S2=s2).Pr(S1=s1,S2=s2). Of 
course, the event C=x, T,=t„ T2=t, is defined analogously. For both 
employers and workers we assume a sequential search strategy. Given a 
contact it is immediately decided whether or not a match is 'rejected' (either 
by employer or worker). Recent evidence, van Ours and Ridder (1992), 
indicates that this assumption may be violated. The number of rejected 
matches is assumed to be generated by a Poisson process with parameter v 
(omitting the index s and v), 
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v = M-(l-^) (9) 
Since S, and S2 are exponentially distributed, we may write Pr(C=x|S1=si-
,S2=S2) = Pr(C=x|S1=s1) simply as: 
- exp(-pvs1)(v\y/xl (10) 
The likelihood contribution for a vacancy is based on the product of (10) and 
the joint density of S! and S2. The latter being simply the product of two 
identical marginal probabilities. 
For jobseekers the derivation of the appropriate likelihood function is 
somewhat more complicated. For employed workers we do not observe 
elapsed search duration T„ and only the number of contacts in the previous 26 
weeks are given. Consequently, a modified likelihood function based on 
Pr(C=x,T2) must be derived. Since T, and T2 are exponentially distributed, 
the latter probability may be written as the product of two marginal 
probabilities. For Pr(C=x) we write: 
0 j -Pr(C=x|T,=t1).Pr(T1=t1)dt1 = 0 J °°[ { expf-j/g.O/gVx! J W U 
+ { exp(-j/26).(j/26)7x! }I<26.M(t1)].0s.exp(-0\t1)dt1 (11) 
The total likelihood is derived using both information on vacancy and job 
search duration. It appears that the data on the number of applicants and the 
number of applications made by workers may be imprecise. Hence, in using 
(10) and (11), we will only use information on whether or not applicants have 
arrived, respectively a worker has made an application (i.e. C=0 versus 
C>0). 
Next, given the estimation results on \ and X, we use reduced form wage 
and reservation wage equations to estimate acceptance probabilities for 
different type of workers. For information on wages and reservation wages we 
had to rely on the workers survey. The acceptance probabilities are used to 
calculate job offer probabilities according to (8). 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
We estimate the parameters X,, X2, a and /? by using information on search 
durations of both employers and employees combined with data on the total 
number of jobseekers and vacancies in the market. In order to identify the 
contact probability (X,) and the conditional match probability (XJ we also use 
information on the total number of applications by jobseekers and the number 
of applicants arriving at a vacancy. 
From the Labour Force Survey we estimate acceptance probabilities using 
information on actual and reservation wages. Combining these probabilities 
with the estimation results on the conditional matching probability (X^ enables 
us to identify the job offer probability. 
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Results on the parameters of the matching function 
The contact probability and the conditional match probability depend on 
occupational variables (with 'other occupations' as the reference group), 
educational variables (reference group: primary education), experience 
(measured as a dummy variable which equals 1 if (required) work experience 
exceeds 3 years) and regional variables (the western part of the Netherlands as 
the reference group). The estimation results are shown in table 3. 
Occupation, education, region and experience are characteristics of 
disaggregated labour markets. These characteristics apply to both job seekers 
and vacancies. Differences in contact probabilities and conditional match 
probabilities over the different disaggregated labour markets can be attributed 
to either sides of the labour market. For instance, a low contact probability 
may be due to inefficiënt search behaviour of (a group of) workers, inefficiënt 
search behaviour of employers or both. Labour market status and gender are 
personal characteristics. Employers are legally not permitted to recruit just for 
male or female workers or just for unemployed of employed workers. 
However after termination of the vacancy duration we observe from which 
subgroup (distinguished by employment status and gender) the jobseeker is 
recruited. 
Table 3 Estimation results for Ay and At" 
contact probability conditional 
A, 
match probability 
A2 
Constant -2.93 (6.6) -1.95 (7.2) 
Occupation 
Services -0.08 (0.4) -0.86 (5.0) 
Administrative -0.13 (1.2) 0.28 (2.0) 
Production -0.65 (4.8) 0.42 (2.3) 
Construction -2.01 (8.9) 2.42 (6.8) 
Education 
Ext. primary 1.31 (5.3) -0.52 (1.9) 
Secondary 0.75 (3.7) 0.12 (0.5) 
Low vocational 0.39 (2.0) 0.60 (2.8) 
Sec. vocational 0.63 (2.8) 0.34 (1.4) 
Higher/academic -0.26 (1.3) 1.04 (4.4) 
Reaion 
North 0.95 (4.3) -1.41 (6.0) 
East -0.66 (7.8) 0.29 (2.7) 
South -0.07 (0.9) 0.01 (0.1) 
Experience 0.76 (11.2) -0.65 (6.5) 
Employed,female -0.67 (3.3) -0.16 (0.6) 
Unemployed, male -0.55 (3.1) -0.80 (3.3) 
Unemployed, female -0.74 (3.6) -0.91 (3.2) 
a 0.41 (5.4) 
0 0.65 (12.4) 
-logL 6920.9 
-logL (a+0=1) 6921.7 
a) absolute t-values between parentheses 
11 
The contact intensity probability \ appears is to be smaller than average 
for production and construction workers. This means that after correcting fct 
possible differences in the numbers of job seekers and vacancies, the 
probability of a contact for these groups of workers is smaller than average. 
Advertisements are not often used for by production and construction workers, 
nor will employers use advertisements to look for this type of labour. The 
search intensity is not very high. Hence, a low contact probability is a logical 
result. For the conditional match probability parameter ^ the opposite holds. 
This probability is higher for production and construction workers. 
Distinguished by educational level it appears that the labour markets for ïhe 
least and the most educated workers have the smallest contact probability. For 
higher vocational educated and academie workers this low contact probability 
is compensated by the highest conditional match probability. For the workers 
with the lowest education, there is no such compensation. 
There are also differences by region. In the northern part of the Nel-
herlands the contact intensity is higher, in the eastern part it is lower than on 
average. Again both differences in contact intensity are compensated by 
opposite differences in conditional acceptance probabilities. Finally, on mar-
kets for experienced workers the contact intensity is higher than for inexperi-
enced workers, while the conditional acceptance probability is lower. 
Labour market status and gender of the worker also influence contact 
intensity and conditional match probability. Employed female workers and 
unemployed workers have a lower contact probability than employed male 
workers. Employed male workers appear to search more effectively than the 
other groups of workers. The conditional match probability is larger for 
employed workers as for unemployed workers. There is no significant 
difference in the conditional match probability of male and female workers. 
A final estimation result presented in table 3 concerns the scale parameters 
a and /3. From a likelihood-ratio test it appears that the constant returns to 
scale restriction a 4-/3 = 1 cannot be rejected. The matching function obviously 
has constant returns to scale. 
To give an idea of the total effects of employment status and gender on the 
match probability, we present calculated contact probabilities and match 
probabilities in table 4. We use the employed male worker as a reference 
group and calculated the probabilities by using average values of the other 
explanatory variables. The calculated probabilities are thus conditional on the 
observed job characteristics. 
Table 4 shows substantial differences in match probabilities over the 
different groups of workers: female workers have a lower match probability 
than males. Unemployed workers have the lowest match probability. 
Comparing the two components of the match probability it is obvious that both 
differences in contact probability and conditional match probability contribute 
to the differences in match probability. The contact probability of employed 
male workers is about twice as high as for the other groups. For the 
conditional match probability the main difference is between employed and 
unemployed wdrkers. The conditional match probability for the unemployed 
workers is less than half of that of employed workers. 
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Table 4 Calculated contact probabilities and conditional match probabilities 
contact probability 
(weekly basis) 
conditional match match 
probability probability 
^ 2 ^ = = ^ 1 ^ 2 
employed male 0.063 0.154 0.010 
reference group = employed male worker 
employed male 1 
employed female 0.52 
unemployed male 0.59 
unemployed female 0 49 
1 
0.87 
0.49 
0.44 
1 
0.45 
0.29 
0.22 
Matching probabilities: job offer and job acceptance 
An interesting question is to what extent the differences in conditional 
match probability are due to employers' behaviour (job offer probability) or 
workers' behaviour (job acceptance probability). To estimate the acceptance 
probabilities for the different groups of workers we used information on 
reservation wages of job seekers and actual wages of workers (see appendix 
2). Using this information we calculated job offer probabilities for the 
different groups of workers. The results of these calculations are given in 
table 5. 
Table 5 Calculated job offer and acceptance probabilities 
job offer 
probability 
P„ 
acceptance 
probability 
P. 
employed male 0.30 0.50 
reference group = employed male worker 
employed male 1 
employed female 1.07 
unemployed male 0.36 
unemployed female 0.47 
1 
0.81 
1.35 
0.94 
conditional match 
probability 
/*2 = P„P. 
0.15 
1 
0.87 
0.49 
0.44 
From this table it appears that there are differences in acceptance 
probabilities, but these differences attribute only a little to the differences in 
conditional match probability. The main difference is that the job offer 
probability for employed workers is more than twice as high than the job offer 
probability for unemployed workers. We therefore conclude that the 
differences in match probability between groups of workers distinguished by 
employment status are to a large extent due to differences in job offer 
probability. Given that a contact occurs between a worker and an employer 
with a job vacancy, employers prefer to offer the job to an employed worker. 
There does not seem to be a gender difference in job offer probabilities and 
conditional match probabilities. 
Some caveats have to be made. The probabilities are calculated for an 
average person in the sample. However, men and women, employed and 
unemployed workers differ in their characteristics. For example, women have 
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lower educational levels and less experience than men. The average woman 
thus has a lower contact intensity and a lower conditional match probability 
compared to the average man. As shown in appendix 3 the job offer 
probability for the average employed female worker is also much smaller than 
for the average employed worker. There is also a substantial difference 
between the average unemployed male and the average unemployed female 
worker. Given that a contact occurred between a job seeker and a vacancy the 
job offer probability is smaller for females, not because they are females, but 
because on average they have less favourable characteristics. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that very little is known about the quality 
of the actual job offers that are made. Whether men and women, employed 
and unemployed workers receive the same job offers, remains unrevealed in 
this study. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we analyze the matching of job seekers and vacancies. We 
decompose the probability of finding a job and filling a job vacancy into a 
contact probability and a conditional matching probability. The latter is further 
decomposed in a job offer probability and a job acceptance probabiMty. 
In the analysis we use information from both sides of theilapour market. 
We use information on job search durations, vacancy durations," riümbers óf 
applications of job seekers and numbers of applicants arriving on vacancies. 
Furthermore we use information on reservation wages of job seekers and 
actual wages of workers. 
We show in this paper that there are differences in contact and matching 
probabilities between labour markets distinguished by occupation, education, 
region and working experience. Both sides of the labour market can generate 
these differences. There are also differences in match probability for workers 
distinguished by labour market status and gender: the match probability for 
unemployed workers is lower than for employed workers. Part of these 
differences are due to differences in contact probability: unemployed workers 
search less efficiënt than employed workers', -Part of the differences may be 
attributed to differences in acceptance probability. The most important 
however are the differences in job offer probability: once a contact is made 
unemployed workers have a substantial lower probability than employed 
workers to get a job offer from the employer. Conditional on the observed 
characteristics employers prefer an employed worker to an unemployed 
worker. We find no differences in job offer probability for men and women. 
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Appendix 1 Definition and sample averages the variables used in the analysis 
a. Definitions 
Occupation 
Services (including nurses) 
Administrative 
Production 
Construction 
Reference group: other occupation 
Education (Classification according to Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics) 
Ext. primary: 30 
Secondary: 40 
Low vocational: 32-38 
Sec. vocational:42-49 
Higher/academic: 50-59, 61-67 
Reference group: lower education (20) 
Region 
North: Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe 
East: Overijssel, Gelderland, Flevoland 
South: Zeeland, Noord-Brabant, Limburg 
Reference group: West (Utrecht, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland) 
Experience: more than 3 years (required when vacancy) 
Reference group: less than 3 years 
b . Sample averages 
Occupation 
Services 
Administrative 
Production 
Construction 
other (ref. group) 
Education 
Lower education 
Ext. primary 
Secondary 
Low vocational 
Sec. vocational 
Higher/academic 
Region 
North 
East 
South 
West 
Experience > 3 years 
< 3 years 
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0.24 
0.22 
0.32 
0.03 
0.19 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08 
0.26 
0.27 
0.22 
0.06 
0.26 
0.22 
0.46 
0.39 
0.61 
Appendix 2 Wages and reservation wages 
Reduced form reservation wage equations are estimated for both employed job 
seekers (wrJ and unemployed jobseekers (wru). From the workers sample we 
also estimated a reduced form wage equation. The Mill's ratio is included to 
correct for sample selectivity. The results of the Probit analysis, used to 
calculate the Mill's ratio, are reported in table A2. 
Table Al Estimation results on wages and reservation wages 
log(w) log(wre) log(wru) 
Constant 2.60 (12.7) 2.66 (14.0) 2.25 (10.5) 
Qccupation 
Services -0.20 (2.0) -0.32 (3.6) -0.26 (1.6) 
Administrative -0.17(1.5) -0.11(1.1) -0.26(1.3) 
Production -0.20 (1.9) -0.35 (3.8) -0.22 (1.3) 
Construction -0.40(1.7) -0.24(1.4) -0.08(0.3) 
Education 
Ext. primary -0.11(0.8) 0.12(0.9) -0.13(1.0) 
Secondary 0.09(0.4) -0.01(0.1) 0.22(1.2) 
Low vocational -0.18 (1.5) -0.04(0.3) -0.14(1.1) 
Sec. vocational -0.07(0.6) 0.18(1.7) -0.17(1.3) 
Higher/academic 0.16(1.2) 0.34(3.0) -0.02(0.1) 
Region 
North -0.14(0.0) 0.03(0.3) -0.05(0.4) 
East -0.00(1.4) 0.01(1.5) -0.06(0.6) 
South -0.06(0.7) 0.11(2.4) -0.01(0.1) 
Log(experience) 0.16(3.1) 0.07(1.4) 0.14(3.0) 
Gender -0.35(4.6) -0.17(2.4) 0.12(1.3) 
Mill's ratio 0.12 (0.7) 
R2 0.27 0.31 0.18 
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Table A2 Probit estimation results employed-unemployed (unemployed = l) 
Constant -2.96 (4.2) 
Occupation 
Services 1.19(2.5) 
Administrative 0.41 (0.8) 
Production 0.85 (1.7) 
Construction 1.39(1.8) 
Education 
Ext. primary 0.07 (0.2) 
Secondary -0.36 (0.6) 
Low vocational -0.12 (0.4) 
Sec. vocational -0.43 (1.3) 
Higher/academic-0.44 (1.3) 
Region 
North -0.04(0.1) 
East -0.17(0.7) 
South 0.14(0.6) 
Age 0.02(2.1) 
Gender 0.52 (0.3) 
Nation (l=non-Dutch) 0.54 (1.3) 
Unempl spells '80-'86 1.37 (8.7) 
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Appendix 3 Differences between the average employed and unemployed male 
and female worker 
Table A3 presents calculated probabilities for four groups of workers: 
employed male, employed female, unemployed male and unemployed female 
workers. The differences between the groups not only reflect differences due 
to labour market status and gender, but also differences due to differences in 
average characteristics like occupation, education and working experience 
between the groups. 
Table A3 Calculated contact, iob offer, acceptance and match probabilities 
Contact Job offer Acceptance match 
<<i Po P. A 
Employed male 0.119 0.252 0.506 0.015 
Reference group = employed male worker 
Employed male 1 1 1 1 
Employed female 0.70 0.57 0.81 0.32 
Unemployed male 0.64 0.39 1.35 0.34 
Unemployed female 0.77 0.22 0.94 0.16 
The table shows that there are substantial differences in match probability 
between the different groups of workers: female and unemployed workers have a 
lower match probability. Unemployed female workers have the lowest match 
probability. Comparing the three parts of the match probability it is obvious that all 
parts contribute to the differences in match probability, but the differences in job 
offer probability are by far the most important. The average job offer probability for 
the unemployed female worker is only 22% of that of the employed male workers. 
We therefore conclude that the differences in match probability between groups 
of workers distinguished by employment status and gender are to a large extent 
due to differences in job offer probability. Given that a contact occurs between a 
worker and an employer with a job vacancy, most employers prefer to offer the job 
to an employed male worker. Employed female workers are less popular, while 
unemployed female workers are on average the least popular. 
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